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COMIREX-D-25.3/1

13 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

SUBJECT: Requirements for Photographic Reconnaissance  
of the Far East --

The attached paper setting forth revised requirements for photographic reconnaissance for the purpose of detecting the transfer to Vietnam of additional types of Communist weapons has been prepared by the Task Force. It is forwarded for study by COMIREX members who should be prepared to discuss it at the COMIREX meeting on 16 November.

for Executive Secretary  
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

Attachment

Copies 2, 3	State TCO
4	DIA
5, 6, 7, 8	DIA TCO
9, 10	OACSI TCO
11, 12	ONI TCO
13, 14, 15, 16	AFNIN TCO
17, 18	NSA TCO
19, 20, 21	NRO TCO

NRO review(s) completed.

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8 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, COMIREX

SUBJECT : [redacted] Task Force--Requirements for  
Photographic Reconnaissance

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1. The [redacted] Task Force has reviewed and revised photographic reconnaissance needs for the purpose of detecting the transfer to Vietnam of additional types of Communist weapons. The Task Force recommends that the modified requirements, attached, be substituted for existing requirements.

2. Certain of the existing requirements, concerning detection of offensive missile systems in North Vietnam, were established by the United States Intelligence Board in May 1967. The modified requirements are consonant with the USIB objectives.

[redacted]  
[redacted] Task Force

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Attachment: a/s

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Task Force--Requirements  
for Photographic Reconnaissance

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1. The [ ] Task Force has the mission of coordinating efforts to detect as early as possible the transfer to Vietnam of additional types of Communist weapons. While surface-to-surface missiles are of special concern, early detection of the deployment of other types of significant weapons--air defense, ground and naval--is also a part of the task force's mission. For these purposes, regular photographic coverage is needed of selected large areas as well as of likely transportation points through which new equipment would be delivered.

NORTH VIETNAM

2. The task force has designated two broad areas of North Vietnam for priority coverage in readable photography. (See attached map of North Vietnam). One hundred percent coverage of these two areas is needed every week, and substantially all of the rest of North Vietnam every three weeks.

3. One of the two priority areas is north of the panhandle. It includes a large area around Hanoi, the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha, and the rail lines connecting Hanoi with China, Haiphong, Thai Nguyen, and the panhandle. It was selected for priority coverage because:

a. it is the area through which all major new weapons systems entering North Vietnam must be brought, and

b. it is the most suitable area for MRBM deployment, because it has:

1. ports, rail lines, and roads--needed for introduction and deployment of MRBMs,

2. excellent air defenses--much of the area is within the SAM envelope and close to interceptor airfields,

3. suitable plain to hilly terrain, and

4. forested areas for concealment.

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4. The second priority area consists of the entire coastline of North Vietnam--overlapping the first area slightly in the Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha areas--and all of the North Vietnam panhandle from just north of Vinh to the demilitarized zone. Range factors make these areas the likely ones for deployment of such tactical missile systems as Scud, Frog, Salish, Samlet, and Styx.

a. Scud, Frog, and Salish would have to be deployed within range of American forces in and near the demilitarized zone.

b. The Samlet and Styx coastal defense missile systems would be deployed in the coastal area to be within range of possible friendly naval ship targets.

c. Whether Styx is deployed on shore or on an Osa or Komar boat, it still must be deployed in the coastal areas to be usable.

5. \*To detect rail and sea shipments of new weapons systems into North Vietnam, nearly daily readable photographic coverage is needed of the following North Vietnamese rail yard and port areas:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Comirex No.</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
<u>Railroad Yards</u>		
Dong Dang		2156N-10642E
Kep		2122N-10636E
Yen Vien		2105N-10555E
Haiphong		2041N-10641E
<u>Ports</u>		
Haiphong		2052N-10642E

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6. Photographic coverage of the following North Vietnamese points is desired on at least a weekly basis:

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Comirex No.</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
<u>Railroad Yards</u>		
Lao Cai		2230N-10358E
Viet Tri		2118N-10526E
<u>Ports</u>		
Hon Gai		2057N-10704E
Cam Pha		2101N-10722E

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